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Executive Summary 
This report discusses issues regarding the two major business taxes in 
Georgia:  The corporate income tax and the net worth tax.  The corporate is based 
on a company’s profit while the net worth tax is based on the value of a 
company’s total assets.   
There are several arguments made by citizens for taxing businesses.  
However, most of these reasons ignore that businesses, including corporations, 
are pass-though entities.  A tax on a corporation is borne by its shareholders, 
employees, and customers. Thus, corporate income taxation has economic effects 
beyond the corporation itself.  The most economically persuasive rationale for the 
taxation of business is to compensate the state for services rendered by the state. 
Currently, the Georgia corporate income tax is the third largest contributor 
to state revenues behind the personal income tax and the state sales tax.  While 
important in terms of revenue, the tax is an unstable revenue source for two 
reasons.  First, the tax base (profits) fluctuates widely over the business cycle.  
Second, the tax base is “leaky” in the sense that the tax is becoming a smaller 
portion of the state’s tax revenues.   
This loss of revenue is likely due to a combination of factors such as: the 
increased use of tax credits; the use of sophisticated tax planning; the use of 
different organizational forms to avoid the corporate income tax; and changes in 
the apportionment formula.  These factors are likely to have had a significant 
effect on the diminished ability of the tax to generate revenue.   
The net worth tax, while never a large contributor to the state’s tax 
receipts, has become even less important over time.  
There are five potential major changes to the Georgia corporate income 
tax that might be considered by the state.  The first is the need to reexamine nexus 
requirements.  Nexus is the legal and constitutional right of the state to tax the 
economic activity of a potential taxpayer.  Policy makers may need to address 
issues of whether expansion or reduction of Georgia’s nexus requirements is 
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desirable in light of technological changes that make the location of production or 
sales more difficult to determine.   
Second, the issue of the apportionment formula might be revisited.  
Georgia adopted a double weighted apportionment formula in the mid 1990s and 
there has been discussion to change the apportionment formula to a single factor 
approach based on sales.  Evidence shows that there will be winners and losers 
from a change to a single factor apportionment formula, but any benefits are 
likely to be found only in the long-term.   
Third, Georgia permits firms to use “separate accounting.”  With separate 
accounting, each firm in a group of related companies may account for their tax 
liability separately rather than in a combined tax return.  Separate accounting has 
problems.  It allows corporations to employ sophisticated tax strategies to shift 
income overseas or to other states.  The use of separate accounting will only 
increase without changes to how corporations report their company-wide income.  
However, it should be noted that states might compete on how they allow firms to 
report, just as they do with other parts of the tax code, so as to attract business to 
the state.   
Fourth, an alternative minimum tax (AMT) could be employed to reduce the 
“deterioration” of corporate revenues to the state.  The AMT does not really solve 
any problems, but it may prolong the time before they have to be dealt with properly. 
Finally, the state might consider replacing business taxes with an activity 
tax such as the value-added tax (VAT).  The VAT is a tax on the value added at 
each stage of production.  It is used in two states in the U.S., but is more common 
internationally.  The imposition of a VAT in Georgia needs a careful 
consideration.  If a full reform of Georgia’s tax system is undertaken, an 
examination of the VAT is warranted as the VAT has a number of benefits.  
However, it does come with some increased administrative costs. Alternatively, if 
there is no major reform of the overall Georgia tax system, the VAT may be 
employed as a complementary tax rather than a replacement tax. This may be 
useful to offset the erosion we observe in the corporate income tax. 
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Introduction 
This report discusses issues associated with the two major taxes used by the 
State of Georgia to tax corporations:  The net worth tax and the corporate income 
tax.1  The net worth tax is a tax based on the value of the company’s total assets.  In 
contrast, the corporate income tax is based on the company’s profit in a given year.  
In general, the two taxes have declined in relative importance over time. 
Table 1 shows the relative size of the corporate income tax and the net worth taxes on 
Georgia companies for three time periods, 1990, 2000 and 2001. We look at these 
three periods to make a number of points.   
Panel A shows the results from fiscal year 2001.  In 2001, the corporate 
income tax was approximately 97 percent of the total business taxes.  The net worth 
tax brought in the remainder.  In addition, the corporate income tax represented less 
than 5 percent of total tax collections. Since 2001 was a year experiencing the 
beginning of a recession, the results need to be put into context. This can be done by 
examining Panels B (fiscal year 2000) and C (fiscal year 1990). 
Over the decade 1990-2000, the percentage of taxes coming from 
corporations fell from 6.98 percent to 5.12 percent.  Corporate income taxes were a 
less reliable source of income in 2000 than in 1990, even accounting for a positive 
real annual growth rate of almost 4 percent in corporate tax revenues over the decade.  
In addition, Panels B and C show that the Net Worth Tax collections as a percentage 
of total taxes has remained relatively stable at approximately 0.26-0.27 percent.  It is 
interesting to note that the absolute value of net worth tax collections increased over 
the period 1990-2000.  However, there is only about a $2 million difference between 
1990 and 2001.  Thus, the 2001 recession seems to have greatly affected net worth 
tax receipts. 
                                                 
1 In addition to these taxes Georgia also taxes financial institutions and insurance companies.  
Banks are subject to the financial institution occupation tax.  However, as the tax is creditable 
against a bank’s income tax, a separate discussion is not warranted.  A second tax on companies 
doing business in the corporate form is the insurance premium tax.  Because this premium tax is 
different than the general corporate tax it is discussed more fully in a separate report, see Martin F. 
Grace, Insurance Taxation in Georgia: Analysis and Options, Fiscal Research Program Report 
No. 17, (1998). 
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  TABLE 1 
PANEL A.  RELATIVE SIZE OF BUSINESS TAXES, FY 2001 
  
FY 2001 
Percent of 
Business Taxes 
Percent of 
Total Taxes 
Company Tax 
      Net Income 
      Net Worth 
Total Business Taxes 
 
Total Taxes Collected 
$690,327,713
$20,371,628
$710,699,341
$13,934,125,749
 
97.13% 
2.87% 
100.00% 
 
--- 
4.95%
0.15%
5.10%
---
SOURCE:  Georgia DOR, Statistical Report (2001). 
 
PANEL B.  RELATIVE SIZE OF BUSINESS TAXES, FY 2000 
  
FY 2000 
Percent of 
Business Taxes 
Percent of 
Total Taxes 
Company Tax 
      Net Income 
      Net Worth 
Total Business Taxes 
 
Total Taxes Collected 
$667,320,938
$33,317,137
$700,638,075
$13,041,654,965
 
95.24% 
4.76% 
100.00% 
 
--- 
5.12%
0.26%
5.37%
---
SOURCE:  Georgia DOR, Statistical Report (2000). 
 
PANEL C.  RELATIVE SIZE OF BUSINESS TAXES, FY 1990 
  
FY 1990 
Percent of 
Business Taxes 
Percent of 
Total Taxes 
Company Tax 
      Net Income 
      Net Worth 
Total Business Taxes 
 
Total Taxes Collected 
$475,033,160
$18,338,297
$493,371,457
$6,802,401,679
 
96.28% 
3,72% 
100.00% 
 
--- 
6.98%
0.27%
7.25%
---
SOURCE:  Georgia DOR, Statistical Report (1990). 
 
Similarly, the 2001 recession affected receipts of the corporate income tax.  
The percentage of corporate income taxes to total taxes collected fell to 4.95 percent 
from fiscal year 2000’s result of 5.12 percent.  As economic activity decreases, 
corporate profits decrease, and the result is lower corporate income tax collections. 
Finally, total company taxes (corporate income and net worth) as a percentage of total 
tax collections were lower in fiscal year 2001 (5.1 percent) compared to fiscal year 
2000 (5.3 percent).  This difference is relatively small, but if compared to fiscal year 
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1990 (Panel C), we see that the percentage of total taxes collected from corporations 
decreased from 7.25 percent. 
As we will discuss further, this reduced importance is a pattern seen at the 
Federal level and across the states.  However, one should note this is a static picture, 
and as we will show below, the amount of business taxes collected fluctuates 
relatively widely on a year-to-year basis. Thus, given the amount of tax collected and 
its potential variability, it is necessary to understand the issues involved in the 
taxation of business in Georgia. 
Georgia is not alone in examining state corporate tax policy.  During the last 
ten years many states altered important parts of their corporate income tax codes to 
accomplish policy goals.  Most of the reforms changed the rate structure, changed the 
apportionment formula, or added business credits.  While Georgia has not altered its 
tax rate or tax base, it has altered the apportionment formula and it has enacted 
significant economic development credits.  We will discuss these reforms in light of 
the experience in Georgia. 
This report is organized as follows.  First is a presentation of the rationales for 
the taxation of business.  Second, we present a description of the tax in Georgia as it 
is currently constructed in conjunction with a description of some recent trends.  
Third, we present some options for the possible modification of the corporate tax in 
Georgia. The last section contains a summary of the report. 
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Rationale for Taxing Business 
Before discussing the company tax situation in Georgia it is also important to 
understand the general rationales behind the taxation of business.  Oakland lists three 
primary reasons why individuals believe taxing business is a good idea.2  First 
business taxation masks the cost of government.  Citizens and political leaders often 
see this as an advantage.  Voters may believe that taxing business is a good idea as it 
is perceived to reduce the voters’ tax liability by shifting it to businesses.  Public 
policy should discourage masking the costs of government.  As Oakland states, 
“decisions on public finances are best made under circumstances in which the costs 
and benefits of public programs are as explicit as possible.”3 
A second reason for taxing business is based on the notion of ability to pay.  
It is commonly believed that corporations are the proper subject of taxation because 
of their size and control of resources.  Thus, corporations appear to have a superior 
ability to bear the burden of taxation.  This argument is commonly employed to make 
the tax system appear more equitable, i.e. those with greater ability to pay should pay 
higher amounts of their income. 
However, a progressive tax structure that may make sense on equity grounds 
for individuals does not make sense for corporations.  The reason for this difference 
is that businesses are not the ultimate taxpayers.  Corporations are merely a set of 
contractual relations between capital owners, other resource owners, and the 
customers of the corporation.  Taxes placed on businesses eventually flow through to 
individual stockholders, employees, suppliers, or customers.   
 For example, a tax on a corporation providing a public service such as 
electricity, which can be a large and profitable enterprise, will be passed on to 
stockholders if net profits fall, to employees if wages fall, or to consumers if prices 
rise.  One cannot guarantee that all shareowners are wealthy individuals as many 
lower- or middle-income individuals may have invested in the corporation for 
                                                 
2This section is based upon William Oakland, “Business Taxation in Louisiana:  An Appraisal”, in 
Louisiana's Fiscal Alternatives ed. by J. A. Richardson (LSU Press: Baton Rouge) 1988: 159-187. 
3ibid, p.165. 
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retirement purposes.  In addition, if we believe that the shareholder is the 
predominant payer of corporate income taxes, then as the percentage of individuals 
owning stock for investment and retirement purposes increases, the number and 
breadth of individuals paying the taxes also increases.   
Employees can also be displaced or have wages lowered as a result of higher 
business taxes.  Thus, employees can bear some of the burden of the tax. Customers 
may pay higher prices as the result of the tax.  Lower-income customers, for example, 
pay a larger percentage of their income on necessities such as electricity.  To the 
extent that a higher profit tax results in higher prices, the higher profits tax on a large 
profitable company, which appears to be progressive, is actually a regressive tax 
because of the relatively larger percentage of income that goes to paying the electric 
bill by the relatively poorer consumer.4 
A third reason for taxing business concerns the attempt by states to export the 
tax liability to taxpayers outside the state.  Many firms sell products in a number of 
states.  If a tax causes firms to raise prices, non-residents can end up bearing a portion 
of the state's tax liability. Similarly, by taxing large publicly held corporations, with 
customers and owners spread throughout the nation, the state can export the tax.  To 
the extent the tax is borne by capital owners or customers, it is then paid by many 
outside the state.  This can be a popular justification for taxing business as state 
residents can enjoy a higher level of public expenditure supported by out-of-state 
residents. 
There are problems with this rationale that affect the industrial base of the 
state.  Suppose, for example, we have two states, one with a tax on business and one 
without.  Suppose the company in the state with the tax on business tries to sell to 
customers in the state that does not tax business.  Suppose further that this company 
tries to “export” the tax and pass along the tax in terms of higher prices.   The firm 
will only be able to pass along the tax if, and only if, it has market power.  As long as 
the other state's markets are competitive, the firm will not be able to pass along the 
                                                 
4A regressive tax is one that makes up a larger share of income for low-income households than 
for higher-income households.  Thus, as income decreases a larger portion of ones income goes to 
paying the tax. 
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tax as customers will chose the lower priced goods.  Thus, in an attempt to raise 
prices and pass along the tax, the firm could lose market share to the firm's 
competitors in other states that are not subject to the tax.  Attempting to export taxes 
through the business tax can make a state's own industries less competitive vis a vis 
other states.  Further, if the company cannot pass along the tax to out-of-state 
consumers, it must pass it along to capital owners, employees, or consumers in its 
home state.  This can reduce the profitability of the state's industry, reduce the state's 
employment opportunities, or potentially, increase the prices paid by its consumers. 
In addition to the potential rationales for business taxation Oakland proposes, 
there are two others of note. The first is based upon the notion that individuals might 
otherwise escape taxation of corporate income if it was not collected at the corporate 
level. This argument confuses tax withholding or reporting with tax collection.  
While economists believe that corporations are pass-through entities, they can still 
withhold or report taxable income on behalf of the shareholder.  Essentially this is 
what is done with the personal income tax.  The employer corporation does not pay 
the employee’s income taxes, but withholds taxes the employee is obligated to pay 
and reports taxable income to the government on behalf of its employees. 
Second, the most economically persuasive rationale for the taxation of 
business is to compensate the state for services rendered by the state.  This rationale 
is based on the premise that government often provides services to firms and that it is 
appropriate for the user of these services to pay for them.  This argument has an 
appeal on the basis of both equity and efficiency.  Those that benefit from the 
corporation's use of state resources should compensate the state for these services.  
Capital owners benefit from the state provision of services, as do employees and 
customers.  Prices paid by customers will thus reflect the true costs of providing state 
services.   
The motive for this type of business taxation is known as the benefit 
principle.  The implementation of the benefit principle is difficult.  Benefits received 
by the corporation from the provision of state services and goods are difficult to 
measure.  More dramatically, it is difficult to even determine the appropriate services 
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for which to charge businesses.  For example, businesses benefit from a better-
educated workforce that is more productive.  It is tempting to tax business for 
educational services provided to them in the form of higher educated workers.   
However, a higher educated worker will likely receive higher wages as a result of his 
or her higher education.  To tax businesses for educational services will, in effect, 
double charge business for education.  Thus, it is important to charge business for 
those goods and services provided directly to it rather than for services rendered to 
employees or other inputs it uses in production of goods and services. 
From the discussion above it is important to understand that corporations are 
not the ultimate taxpayers, rather the shareholders, employers and consumers are the 
true taxpayers.  This is an important concern and should be kept in mind for the 
remainder of the report. 
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General Corporation Taxes 
A. Corporate Income Taxation 
1. History and Recent Trends 
The corporation income tax was first introduced in Georgia in 1929. The tax 
rate has always been a flat proportional rate, fluctuating over time between 4 percent 
and 7.5 percent. The present rate of 6 percent has been in place since 1969. The 
corporation franchise tax, levied on net worth, is administered in conjunction with the 
corporation income tax. This is a relatively minor tax in terms of revenue production, 
and it will be discussed separately in Section B.  
Decreasing importance:  The corporate income tax is the third largest revenue 
producer for the state after the personal income and sales taxes and is closely 
followed by the motor fuel tax. However, its relative importance for state tax 
revenues has changed in the recent past. In 1980 the corporate income tax represented 
approximately 9.5 percent of state tax collections.  In 1990 the corporation income 
tax was approximately 7 percent of state total taxes, and by 2001 it represented only 
4.95 percent (Figure 1).  
FIGURE 1.  CORPORATE INCOME TAX (CIT) AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL TAXES 
COLLECTIONS, 1980-2001 
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
CIT as a % of Total Tax Collections
Source:  Calculations made from Department of Revenue Statistical Reports and CPI data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Georgia’s Corporate Income  
and Net Worth Taxes 
 
 
Volatility of revenues:  The most important reason for this lackluster 
performance is that the corporation tax is very sensitive to fluctuations in the 
economic business cycle; much more so than is the case for the individual income 
tax, the sales tax or the property tax. Figure 2 shows the real (i.e. inflation adjusted) 
growth rate of total corporate taxes, corporate income taxes, and the net worth tax 
over time. We see that real corporate income tax growth rates are volatile compared 
to the total tax collections growth rate.  Further, the growth rate of the corporate taxes 
(both corporate income and net worth) are cyclical, corresponding to changes in the 
business cycle.   
FIGURE 2.  REAL GROWTH RATES FOR TOTAL TAXES REVENUES, CORPORATE 
INCOME TAX REVENUES, & NET WORTH TAX REVENUES, FOR GEORGIA, 1987-
2001 
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Source:  Calculations made from Department of Revenue Statistical Reports and CPI data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.
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The growth rate in corporation tax revenues after adjusting for inflation is below 5 
percent in the late 1980s. This growth rate turned sharply negative over the last three 
years. The more volatile nature of corporate income taxes vis-a-vis other revenues is 
also illustrated in Figure 2 where the rate of growth of corporate income taxes is 
compared to the growth of Georgia's total tax revenues and the Net Worth tax. 
Behavior similar to that of other states:  Georgia's corporate income tax 
revenues have not behaved markedly different from the typical corporation income 
tax in those states with income taxes. Corporate income taxes as percentage of total 
taxes almost perfectly shadow the experience of other states.  Most states are also 
experiencing a general downturn in the importance of the corporate income tax 
relative to total tax revenues, a point that will be discussed further below.  In 
addition, Table 2 shows that in 2000, Georgia was below the national average in the 
percentage of corporate income taxes as a share of total tax revenues. In the 
Southeastern U.S. it is among the highest.  All southeastern states except North 
Carolina and Tennessee depend upon the corporate income tax to a lesser extent than 
Georgia. 
 
TABLE 2.  PERCENTAGE OF TAX REVENUES FROM THE 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, SOUTHEASTERN U.S., 2000 
 Percent Tax  
Revenues 
From CIT 
 
 
Rank 
Louisiana 
South Carolina 
Alabama 
Kentucky 
Virginia 
Florida 
Mississippi 
Arkansas 
Georgia 
North Carolina 
Tennessee 
3.40 
3.60 
3.80 
4.00 
4.50 
4.80 
4.80 
4.90 
5.30 
6.50 
7.90 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
United States 6.00  
SOURCE:  Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government 
Finances, http://www.census.gov/govs/ www/estimate.html. 
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2.  General Overview of the Corporate Income and Net Worth Taxes 
All domestic (Georgia) corporations, unless specifically exempt, are subject 
to the corporate income and net worth taxes.5 Further, foreign (non-Georgia) 
corporations owning property or “doing business” in Georgia are subject to these 
taxes. Companies that are taxable are establishments with business nexus in the state 
of Georgia.6  The interpretation of “doing business” in Georgia includes all activities 
for financial profit or gain.7 However, isolated transactions or the simple solicitation 
of sales do not come under the scope of the tax.8  The annual corporate franchise tax 
on net worth is imposed on both domestic and foreign companies. The State Revenue 
Commissioner issues the rules and regulations necessary for the administration and 
enforcement of these two taxes. 
Domestic and foreign financial depositary institutions (banks, savings and 
loans associations, and credit unions) have been subject to the corporation income tax 
and the franchise net worth tax since 1983. In addition, depository financial 
institutions pay two additional taxes: the “Local Business License Tax” which cities 
and counties may levy within their respective jurisdictions, and the “State Occupation 
Tax.”9 These two license taxes are levied at a rate of 0.25 percent each on gross 
receipts. The payments for these two taxes are creditable dollar-for- dollar against the 
financial institution's corporate income tax liability.  This is discussed further below. 
Insurance companies are exempt from the corporate income tax but they pay 
a state premium tax on gross premiums, with the rate ranging from 0.5 percent for 
companies investing in Georgia assets to 2.25 percent for companies with little or no 
investment in Georgia. There is also a local tax on insurance premiums collected by 
                                                 
5The major exceptions are for not-for profit corporations, insurance companies paying a premium 
tax, and mutual savings banks. OCGA § 48-7-25. 
6OCGA § 48-7-20. Nexus, discussed further below is that minimal connection between a business 
and a state that will allow the state to legally tax a business. 
7OCGA § 48-731(a). 
8Public Law 86-272 (1959) codified at 15 USC §§ 381-385.  Public Law 86-272 prohibits state 
taxation of net income from interstate commerce when the only within state activity is solicitation 
for sales of tangible personal property for which orders are subject to acceptance outside the state 
and are filled for shipment outside of the state.  This prohibits the taxation of income from the 
mere solicitation of sales in Georgia by companies outside the state. 
9OCGA § 48-6-93. 
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the state and remitted to counties and municipalities based upon their relative 
populations. Insurance companies also pay the franchise tax on net worth.10 
3. Computation of the Corporate Income Tax 
Introduction: The computation of Georgia's corporate income tax starts with 
federal taxable income as the tax base.11  This calculation of Georgia's corporation tax 
is described in Table 3. Corporations follow federal rules for accounting methods and 
periods. Other aspects of the tax conform basically to the federal corporate income 
tax, including such items as inventories, bad debts, and charitable contributions. 
Federal tax rules are also followed for depreciation of property placed in service in or 
after 1987. The federal Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) that became 
effective in 1981 was not adopted in Georgia so some adjustments to the Georgia 
definition of net income are necessary.12 The net operating loss is computed under 
federal rules. However, only the amount of losses attributable to business in Georgia 
is allowed.  Further, losses incurred when the corporation was not subject to taxation 
in Georgia are not allowed.13 
Corporate Income Tax Base and Rate: The corporate income tax rate is a flat 
6 percent and it is imposed on the Georgia taxable net income. To arrive at Georgia 
taxable net income (see Table 3), federal taxable income is adjusted by adding certain 
income exempt at the federal level and by eliminating deductions disallowed by 
Georgia and by subtracting interest on  the  holdings  of  financial  obligations  of  the   
                                                 
10OCGA §  33-8-4.  For a discussion of insurance taxation in Georgia, see Grace (1998) supra note 
1. 
11OCGA § 48-7-27. 
12OCGA § 48-7-27(c). 
13OCGA § 48-7-27b(4).  The net operating loss (NOL) works in the following manner.  If a 
taxpayer experiences a NOL in a given year, the federal laws allow the company to amend its 
previous two years of tax returns to offset taxable income in the previous two years.  If, in 
addition, the taxpayers still has additional loses that were not able to be applied to the two 
previous years of net income, it is possible to include the NOL against future income for up to 20 
years.  The important modification for the purposes of Georgia law is that if the taxpayer was not 
doing business in Georgia during the previous two years, the taxpayer would not be able to deduct 
the NOL from Georgia taxable income.  The use of the NOL is permissible to the extent that the 
taxpayer corporation had experienced positive net income in Georgia in the past two years.  This 
makes sense because if the company was not subject to taxation in Georgia, it should not be able 
to take a deduction against Georgia income. 
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TABLE 3.  CALCULATION OF GEORGIA TAX LIABILITY 
Step 1  Calculation of Net Business Income 
Start with Federal Taxable Income 
Add: 
 
 
 
 
 
Subtract: 
Additions to Federal Taxable Income 
Non-Georgia State and Local Bond Interest 
Non-Georgia State and Local Income Taxes 
Expenses Attributed to Exempt Income 
New Operating Losses from Federal Return 
Other 
Subtractions from Federal Taxable Income 
Interest on U.S. Obligations 
Other 
Equals Net Business Income (NBI) 
Step 2  Calculation of NBI Apportioned to Georgia 
Start with NBI 
Subtract: Income Allocated Everywhere 
Equals Business Income Subject to Apportionment (BISA) 
Step 3  Calculation of Net business Income Apportioned to Georgia 
Start with BISA 
Business Income Subject to Apportionment * Double Weighted 3-Factor 
                  (.25*% Employment in GA + .5*%Sales in GA +.25*% Property in GA) 
Equals Net Business Income Apportioned to Georgia (NBIAG) 
Step 4 Calculation of Georgia Taxable Income 
Start with NBIAG 
Add: 
Subtract: 
Net Income Allocated to Georgia 
Net Operating Loses Allocated to Georgia 
Equals Georgia Taxable Income 
Step 5 Calculation of Georgia Tax Liability 
Start with Georgia Taxable Income 
Georgia Taxable Income*Tax Rate (6.0%) 
Subtract: Credits 
Equals Georgia Corporate Income Tax Liability 
 
U.S.  This net business income is then either allocated to Georgia or apportioned to 
Georgia according to a measure of business done in Georgia.14 
Apportionment and Allocation:  An important distinction to make is the 
difference between allocable and apportionable income.  Allocable income is that 
                                                 
14See OCGA § 48-7-31(c ). Georgia allocates non-business income to Georgia for (1) interest on 
investments if the securities are located in Georgia; (2) for property held for investment purposes 
located in Georgia, and (3) for gains from the sale of tangible property that is not part of the 
business of the company if located in Georgia. 
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income such as rents, royalties, capital gains from the sale of property or other so-
called non-business income. In contrast, apportionable income is that income that 
arises out of the operation of the business and is apportioned to Georgia based on the 
amount of business done in Georgia relative to the rest of the country.15  Essentially 
apportionable income can be thought of as income from the sale of goods and 
services produced by the firm while allocated income is earned in a passive way. 
Once the income is allocated and the apportionable income is apportioned to Georgia 
(step 3 in Table 3), we have Net Income Allocated to Georgia.  This becomes the tax 
base for the state income tax.   
At least twelve states do not distinguish between allocable and apportionable 
income. These are known as “full apportionment states.”  Many other states, 
including Georgia, distinguish between allocable and apportionable income.16 Most 
often what is apportionable and what is allocable depends on whether the income is 
defined as business or non-business income, respectively. Business income is 
generally defined as that earned during the regular course of business.17  The 
presumption for the distinction lies in the fact that some incomes are not earned by 
the application of factors of production but simply by the corporate entity itself and 
these should be sitused, or located for tax purposes, where the corporation is 
domiciled. For example, dividend income from the ownership of stock of other 
companies is considered to be earned by the corporation in a way that is different 
from the income derived from production and sale of goods and services. Many of the 
distinctions made for such items as royalties and technical service fees as passive 
income have little economic justification, as income is fungible no matter the source.  
As in other areas of state corporate taxation, the potential for double taxation 
of certain types of income increases because the same income may be considered 
apportionable in one state and allocable in another. This can be seen by an example.  
                                                 
15 The apportionment methodology is discussed more fully below. 
16OCGA § 48-7-31. 
17A number of states (not including Georgia) have passed a model or uniform tax law to rectify 
some problems with multiple taxing jurisdictions. This law, known as UDITPA (Uniform 
Distribution of Income for Tax Purposes Act), allocates only non-business income which is 
defined as originating in assets not in use for daily business activities.  Thus signatory states do 
not double tax non-business income.   
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Suppose a multistate taxpayer has $100 in non-business income.  One state where the 
firm operates uses an apportionment rule that states that all income (both business 
and non-business) be apportioned on the basis of the percentage of the company’s 
sales within the state.   Let us suppose that this apportionment in fact apportions 20 
percent of the firm’s non-business income to the state.  Further, another state where 
the company has its headquarters and all of its intangible property requires that all 
non-business income located in that state is allocated to that state.  In this example, 
the non-business income tax base is subject to double taxation:  once in the state that 
requires allocation of the income (20 percent) and once in the state that requires 
apportionment of the income (100 percent).   
The clear incentive for “headquarter” states is to classify income as allocable 
because 100 percent of it is taxed in the state. The disadvantage is that a very 
aggressive position on allocable income may cause some corporations to choose a 
different state for domicile. States with relatively few important company 
headquarters may be able to increase tax collections with the “full apportionment” 
approach in the sense that they will be able to be more aggressive in classifying 
income as allocatable income. 
In Georgia, several income items are specifically allocated to the state and are 
not apportionable. Net investment income from intangible property (bonds held for 
investment and other income from intangible assets as well as rentals from realty held 
for investment) is allocated to the state of Georgia if the corporation's situs is in the 
Georgia.18 Net investment income from tangible property located in the state is also 
allocated to Georgia.19 
Income (otherwise not specifically allocated) from manufacturing, production 
or selling of tangible personal property is apportioned by using a three-factor 
apportionment formula with a double weighted sales factor.  This implies that sales 
are weighted 50 percent and property and payroll are weighted 25 percent each.  The 
apportionment formula can be written as  
                                                 
18OCGA § 48-7-30. 
19OCGA § 48-7-31. 
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Georgia Apportionment Factor = .25 * %Property + .25 * % Wages  
+ .5 * %Sales 
 
where %Property represent the percentage of property owned by a company that is 
located in Georgia, %Wages is the percentage of a company’s total wages and 
salaries paid to employees located in Georgia, and the %Sales represents the 
percentage of total sales of the corporation that occur in Georgia. 
 It is easy to see that the weights on the various factors can influence the 
amount of income apportioned to Georgia.  For example, if the taxpayer corporation 
did no business outside the state of Georgia, then the apportionment factor would be 
100 percent (as each of the three factors would be 100 percent) and the corporation 
would apportion all of its income to Georgia. Similarly, if a company operated 
nationwide and had, say, 1 percent of its property, 1 percent of its employees, and 1 
percent of its sales in Georgia, it would apportion only 1 percent of its income to the 
state of Georgia. 
 In 1995, Georgia changed from an equal weighted apportionment factor 
formula (33 percent on wages, property, and sales, respectively) to a double weighted 
approach with the idea that it would benefit those companies with relatively large 
percentages of company payroll and relatively large percentages of company property 
located in Georgia.  To see how this would work, suppose we have a company with 
75 percent of its wages and salaries located in Georgia as well as 75 percent of its 
property located in Georgia.  Additionally, let us assume that 25 percent of its sales 
are in Georgia.  In the case of equal weighted apportionment, the Georgia 
apportionment factor would be 0.5775 while the double weighted apportionment 
factor would be 0.38.  Thus, by moving from an equal weighted apportionment 
formula to one with double weights on sales, the company is required to apportion 
19.75 percent (=57.75 percent-38 percent) less profits to Georgia.20 
                                                 
20If the taxpayer owns no property then the apportionment formula is 
0.33*%Wages+.0.67*%Sales.  A similar adjustment is made if the company has no employees.  
Alternatively if the firm has sales, then the apportionment factor is .5*%Property+.5*%Wages.  
See Rule 560-7-7.03(d) of the Administrative Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia. 
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There is also provision for the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue 
to allow a different allocation formula if the apportionment does not fairly represent 
the extent of the taxpayer’s activity within the state.21 Further, under a Georgia law 
effective in 1998, the Commissioner of Revenue has the authority to determine 
whether a change in apportionment may be allowed for legitimate economic 
development needs.  The law allows the Revenue Commissioner to enter into 
agreements with a taxpayer to change the apportionment rules for a limited time. The 
statute contemplates an economic development rationale for this exception to the 
normal apportionment rules.  Thus, apportionment rules may be altered under this 
section only if the taxpayer is planning a new facility or expanding a current facility 
in the state.  In addition, the Revenue Commissioner must believe the new facilities 
will bring substantial economic benefit to the region where the project is located and 
that the benefits of the project outweigh the costs to the public.22 
The service sector of the economy also presents some special problems for 
apportionment.  Historically service providers were local business and the traditional 
three factor formula would capture the economic activity of the service provider as 
the business was likely to be conducted entirely within the state.   For example, 
mutual funds, airlines, or banks may balk at a traditional three factor formula since 
the formula may not reflect the economic activity of the firm within the state.  With 
services being provided across state lines, the question arises as to where the sale 
actually took place.  A sale could be in the producer’s state or it could be in the 
customer’s state of residence.  Without guidance a firm may choose an apportionment 
formula to minimize its state tax liability.   
                                                 
21See § O.C.G.A. 48-7-31(e) and see Rule 560-7-7.03(e) of the Administrative Rules and 
Regulations of the State of Georgia. 
22OCGA § 48-7-31.1.  The Revenue Commissioner when presented with a Freedom of 
Information Act request by a newspaper would not disclose the companies with approved 
apportionment formulas due to taxpayer privacy restrictions.  However, the Georgia legislature 
enacted law in 2002 allowing disclosure OCGA § 48-7-31.1(3)(B)(b).  See also, Meredith Jordan, 
“State Reveals Companies that Got Tax Breaks,” Atlanta Business Chronicle, May 3, 2002 
(http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2002/05/06/story3.html).  
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No general formula has been designed specifically for the service sector, but   
there are explicit apportionment formulas for airlines23 and credit card processors.24 
These explicit formulas attempt to apportion income to the state based on economic 
activity within Georgia. However, like all firms there is the potential for a service 
firm to ask the revenue commissioner for permission to use a formula that will 
apportion profits more equitably to Georgia.  This may be more of an issue as the 
economy becomes more oriented towards the service sector.  If a service provider can 
determine its own equitable apportionment, it will do so to minimize its own tax 
liability.  This could become an issue of inequitable treatment between manufacturing 
and service firms, which could then cause a potential revenue loss to the state.  
However, the administrative rules suggest the demand for a different apportionment 
formula be employed in “limited and specific cases” where there are unusual fact 
situations that will be unique and nonrecurring. Further, the permission is granted 
only for one year.25 
Credits:  The state provides a number of credits for corporate taxpayers.  
These credits are a recent phenomenon and most the credits have been enacted in the 
last ten years. Credits are allowed for certain types of business enterprises consisting 
of manufacturing, warehousing, processing, telecommunications, tourism, or research 
and development industries and include the following credits:  
Job Tax Credit – Business Expansion and Support Act (BEST) credits are 
available for qualified expenditures made in Georgia.  The value of the BEST credit 
to the taxpayer differs depending on the location of the employment.  Since the BEST 
                                                 
23OCGA § 48-7-31(2.1)(B) states that air lines must use a 3 factor formula based upon revenue 
producing air miles in Georgia relative to the rest of the country, tons of property shipped from 
Georgia, and originating revenue factor which is the percentage of the total passenger and cargo 
revenue attributable to Georgia divided by the total revenue from cargo and passenger operations 
everywhere else.  Like the general manufacturing approach the apportionment formula is based on 
25 percent of the air revenue factor, 25 percent of the tons of cargo factor, and 50 percent the 
passenger and cargo revenue. 
24OCGA § 48-7-31(2.2).  If more than 60 percent of total gross receipts comes from credit card 
processing services, then the apportionment formula is based upon the portion of credit card 
processing fees earned in Georgia.  This single factor apportionment formula is available to those 
credit card processors with a principal office in Georgia or if their principal customer is in 
Georgia. 
25Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia 560-7-7.03(8)e(1)-(2). 
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program was designed with economic development in mind, larger credits are given 
to jobs created in less developed counties.  Each year the Commissioner of 
Community Affairs must rank each of Georgia’s counties based upon the 
unemployment rate, the per capita income, and the percentage of persons within the 
county that are below poverty level.  Each of these socioeconomic factors is weighted 
equally.  Counties ranking between 1 and 71 are designated tier 1 counties, counties 
ranked between 72 and 106 are classified as tier 2 counties, those counties ranked 
107-141 are tier 3 counties, and the remaining 18 are classified as tier 4.26  
Businesses are permitted a credit of $3,500 per job per year up to five years if 
a job is created in a tier 1 county.  If a job is created in a tier 2 county the jobs credit 
is $2,500 while if the job is created in a tier 3 county, the credit is $1,250. Finally the 
job credit in a tier 4 county is $750.  
 In order for the taxpayer to be eligible for the credit there are a number of 
conditions to be satisfied.  The first is based upon the number of jobs created.  In a 
tier 1 county, if the taxpayer desires to take the job credit it must create at least five 
jobs.  For tier 2 counties the taxpayer must create 10, while those in tier 3 counties 
must create 15 new jobs.  Finally, those in tier 4 counties must create 25 new jobs to 
be able to take the credit. 
Second, the average wage of the new jobs created must be above the average 
wage of the county with the lowest average wage. Finally, each job created must have 
health insurance as a benefit option, although the law does not require that the 
employer pay any part of the health insurance coverage. 
These credits are good for five years starting in the year after the year the job 
is created.  In addition, they can be carried forward for up to ten years.  However, any 
credit taken in a given year cannot be greater than 50 percent of the taxpayer’s 
liability for that year for those placing jobs in tier 3 or tier 4 counties.  For taxpayers 
creating jobs in tier 1 and tier 2 counties, the credit cannot be more than 100 percent 
of the taxpayer’s liability. 
                                                 
26OCGA §48-7-40. 
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A job credit similar to that available in tier 1 counties is available to 
businesses that place jobs in certain blocks of census tracks certified by the 
Commissioner of Community Affairs as “having undergone a sudden and severe 
period of economic distressed caused by the closing of one or more businesses in the 
area” or if a business is being bought out for airport expansion, or the closing of a 
business in this area which would result in a sudden and severe period of economic 
distress.27  
Investment Tax Credit - A credit against income tax otherwise due is 
authorized for qualified investment property purchased or acquired for use in 
construction or expansion of manufacturing or manufacturing support facilities. 
Subject to specific conditions and limitations, the allowable credit ranges from 1 
percent to 5 percent of the cost of such qualified property with the higher credit 
amounts and the lower threshold investment requirements applying in Georgia's less 
developed areas. The range of credits is 3 percent to 8 percent for qualifying 
recycling and pollution control property investments. Further, the credit cannot be 
applied to greater than 50 percent of the taxpayer’s tax liability for the year. 
Optional Investment Tax Credit – This credit can be taken in lieu of the above 
investment tax credit each year for up to 10 years if the qualifying property remains 
in service for that period.  This optional credit is calculated based upon a three-year 
average tax liability and is the lesser of (1) 90 percent of the increase in tax liability 
in the current year over that in a base year; or (2) the excess of the aggregate amount 
of the credit allowed over the sum of the amounts of the credit already used in the 
years following the base year.28 
Alternative Fuels Credit - This credit is available to those who purchase or 
lease alternative fuel (low or zero emission) vehicles.  The credit is available for 
$2,500 for the purchase or lease of a low emissions vehicle and $5,000 for a zero 
emissions vehicle.29 
                                                 
27OCGA § 48-7-40.1. 
28OCGA § 48-7-40.7 -40.9. 
29 OCGA § 48-7-40.16. 
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Water Conservation Facilities Credit - Credits are allowed for taxpayers who 
participate in qualified water conservation investment in Georgia. The investment 
must meet minimum standards and the credits range from 5 percent to 10 percent 
depending upon the size of the investment in such qualified property. The credit 
cannot exceed 50 percent of the taxpayer's tax liability for the year and the credit can 
be carried forward for ten years.30 Similar credits are provided for taxpayers investing 
in qualified property designed to reduce ground water usage.31  
Retraining Tax Credit – Credits allow eligible employers to claim retraining 
costs to train employees to use new equipment or technology.  The credit can be 
worth 50 percent of the direct costs of retraining full time employees up to $500 per 
year per employee for qualified training programs.  The credit cannot be greater than 
50 percent of the company’s corporate income tax liability for a given tax year.  
Unused credits can be carried forward for up to 10 years.32 
Basic Skills Education Credit - Employers can obtain a credit when they 
provide or sponsor basic skills education for high school level coursework and/or for 
coursework leading to a GED.  The credit is equal to one-third of the costs of the 
program up to $150 per student.  The total credits taken in a given year cannot be 
greater than the taxpayer’s tax liability for that year.33 
Child Care Credits – Employers sponsoring childcare for employees are 
credited with up to 75 percent of the direct costs of the program.  The credit, like 
most other credits, is limited to 50 percent of the taxpayer’s current year tax liability.  
Further, the taxpayer can obtain a credit for 100 percent of any property purchased 
for childcare services.  This property credit is allowable at a 10 percent rate for 10 
years.34 
Research Tax Credit - Credits are allowed for research expense undertaken 
within Georgia for any business or headquarters of any business engaged in 
                                                 
30OCGA § 48-7-40.11. An anonymous source at the Georgia Department of Revenue believes that 
that no corporation has taken this credit. 
31OCGA § 48-7-40.10.   
32OCGA § 48-7-40.5. 
33OCGA § 48-7-41. 
34 OCGA § 48-7-40.6. 
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manufacturing, warehousing and distribution, processing, telecommunications, 
tourism, or research and development.  The credit is 10 percent over a “base amount” 
that is a function of the research expenses averaged as a percentage of taxable income 
for the last three years.  The credit can be carried forward for a period of 10 years and 
may not amount to over 50 percent of the taxpayer’s tax liability in any given year.35 
Small Business Growth Companies Tax Credit - This credit is for small 
business (less than $1.5 million in tax liability) and is available for business or 
headquarters of any business engaged in manufacturing, warehousing and 
distribution, processing, telecommunications, tourism, or research and development 
that experiences a growth of its net state taxable income greater than 20 percent over 
the previous year in each of the last three years.  The credit is the excess over the 20 
percent growth in net taxable income and may not exceed 50 percent of the 
taxpayer’s current year tax liability.36 
Ports Activity Job and Investment Credits - These credits are available to 
companies that increase their port tonnage through a Georgia ports.  The companies 
must increase their traffic by more than 10 percent over a base defined by 1997 
traffic.  These credits are combined with the BEST Jobs Credit, the Investment Tax 
Credit, and the Optional Investment Credit.  Thus, if companies are eligible for the 
credit they can take an additional $1,250 per job created, or 5 percent investment tax 
credit, or a 10 percent optional tax credit.  Further, if companies create more than 400 
jobs, invest $20 million or more in new or expanded facilities, and increase their 
traffic by more than 20 percent, they can take both the job tax credit and the 
investment tax credit.37 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit - This credit is available for taxpayers 
owning housing developments receiving the Federal Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit.  The credit available for the property owner is the value of the Federal 
credit.38 
                                                 
35 OCGA § 48-7-40.12. 
36 OCGA § 48-7-40.13. 
37 OCGA § 48-7-40.15. 
38 OCGA § 48-7-40.17. 
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Headquarters Tax Credit - This credit is available for companies establishing 
a headquarters in Georgia.  To be eligible the companies must create at least 100 
headquarters jobs, and spend at least $1,000,000 in construction or leasing expenses 
to establish a location for the headquarters.  This is a jobs credit so that the jobs, to 
qualify for the credit, must pay a salary which must be a differential above the county 
average wage in the county in which it is located.  Like the jobs tax credit, the 
necessary salary differential is smaller in lesser-developed counties.  The credit is 
$2,500 per job, or $5,000 if the salary is above 200 percent of the county average 
wage.  In addition, this credit can offset up to 100 percent of a taxpayer’s tax liability.  
If the credit is greater than that, it can be further offset against the corporations 
monthly or quarterly withholding.39 
Finally, as discussed above, financial institutions are allowed credit for local 
business license and state occupation taxes paid.40  These are dollar-for-dollar 
creditable against the financial institution’s insurance tax liability. 
Figure 3 shows the value of the total credits over time.  As can be seen, the 
total dollar amount of the credits increases over time, as does the percentage of 
credits relative to the total corporate income tax collected.  The increase in available 
credits has an effect on the ability of the corporate income tax to raise revenue.  This 
should be kept in mind when we discuss the general erosion of the corporate income 
tax. 
Faulk et al. evaluate many of these credits. 41  Their conclusions regarding the 
jobs credits are interesting. First, only a fraction of the jobs created (29 percent) were 
actually created as a result of the BEST Credits.  In addition, participation is low due 
to lack of information about the credit, the high administrative burden and because 
many firms have little tax liability.  Finally, while the largest benefits of the credit 
were  designed  to  provide  incentives  for companies to locate jobs in less developed 
                                                 
39OCGA § 48-7-40.17. 
40OCGA § 48-7-93(e). 
41 Dagney Fault, Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, David L. Sjoquist, William Smith, Jeanie Thomas, and 
Kathleen Thomas, An Analysis of Georgia’s Economic Development Tax Credit Incentives, Fiscal 
Research Program Report No. 42 (January 2000). 
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FIGURE 3.  GEORGIA BUSINESS TAX CREDITS, 1995-2001 
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Source:  Kelly Edmiston, Fiscal Research Program, based on data provided by the Georgia Department of Revenue.
areas of the state nearly half of the jobs were created in the most developed counties 
in the state.  Thus, there is evidence that the credits are not going to those areas where 
the need is arguably most critical.   In addition, the jobs credits by themselves have 
increased as a percentage of the total tax credits from 10 percent in 1995 to 21 
percent in 2001. 
Economic development is important to Georgia and the southeastern states. 
Table 4 shows a comparison of tax incentives for a number of southeastern states.  
Georgia, as mentioned above, has a jobs credit and a credit for business investment in 
certain enterprise zones.  Other states have enacted jobs creation credits where a 
given minimum number of jobs must be created as a requirement for obtaining the 
credit.  Others states have also added a development aspect by requiring the jobs be 
combined with an investment and/or requiring the jobs be created in less developed 
areas  of  the state.   The southeastern states appear to be quite competitive in offering 
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TABLE 4.  PRESENCE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX CREDITS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN 
U.S. 
 
State 
 
Jobs Credit 
Investment  
Credit 
Enterprise  
Zone Credit 
Alabama Yes if at least 20 jobs created 
+ minimum investment 
Yes  
Arkansas Yes and credit increases for 
jobs in disadvantaged areas 
 Yes 
Florida Yes if at least 10 jobs are 
created 
  
Georgia Yes if at least 5 jobs are 
created and credit increases 
for jobs in disadvantaged 
areas 
Yes Yes 
Kentucky Yes if at least 25 jobs are 
created 
 Yes 
Louisiana Yes, but ends in 2002  Yes 
Mississippi Yes  Yes 
North Carolina Yes if at least 5 jobs created Yes Yes 
South Carolina Yes if at least 10 jobs created Yes Yes 
Tennessee Yes if at least 25 jobs created 
+ minimum investment 
Yes Yes 
Virginia Yes if 50 jobs created  Yes 
SOURCES:  Multistate Tax Guide, 2001, J. Thomas, State Economic Development 
Invectives in the Southeast, Fiscal Research Program Report 40, Summary Table p.4 
(1999), and state economic development websites. 
 
economic development incentives based on credits to the income tax.42 What is 
important to note is that while Georgia’s tax credits are potentially expensive in terms 
of lost tax revenue, they may be needed to keep Georgia competitive with other 
states. 
                                                 
42See Multistate Tax Guide, 2001, pp 681-706.  Also see Jeanie Thomas, State Economic 
Development Incentives in the Southeast, Fiscal Research Program Report 40, (1999) for an over 
view of economic development activities in the southeast. 
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4.  Structure of the Tax by Taxable Income 
Table 5 shows the distribution of income taxes paid by taxable income for 
fiscal year 2000.  The largest firms in terms of taxable income, those with taxable 
income over $1 million accounted for 1.29 percent of the returns, and pay 
approximately 80.38 percent of the corporate income tax.  The next highest group of 
taxpayers, those with incomes of $500,000 to $1 million, contributed 6.38 percent of 
the total tax collected while accounting for 0.89 percent of the taxpayers.  It should be 
noted that a super majority (74.19 percent) of returns had no income tax liability.   
TABLE 5.  DISTRIBUTION OF TAXABLE INCOME, FISCAL YEAR 2000 
  
 
 
N 
 
 
Percent of 
Returns 
 
 
Net Taxable 
Income 
Percent 
of Net 
Taxable 
Income 
$1-$5,000 
$5,000-$10,000 
$10,000-$25,000 
$25,000-$50,000 
$50,000-$100,000 
$100,000-$250,000 
$250,000-$500,000 
$500,000-$1,000,000 
over $1,000,000 
None 
5,686
2,258
3,859
3,266
2,768
2,304
1,213
819
1,184
68,013
6.53
2.46
4.21
3.56
3.02
2.51
1.32
0.89
1.29
74.19
$10,654,792 
$16,445,509 
$64,275,550 
$118,227,242 
$196,357,515 
$364,206,799 
$428,984,309 
$577,380,152 
$7,276,607,754 
--- 
0.12
0.18
0.71
1.31
2.17
4.02
4.74
6.38
80.38
0.00
 91,670 $9,053,139,622 
SOURCE:  Georgia Department of Revenue Report, 2001. 
 
5.   The Decreasing Importance of the Corporate Income Tax 
The volatility in tax revenues of Georgia's company taxes from 1990 to 2001 
(Figure 1 and Figure 2), and the general decrease in importance of the corporate 
franchise tax in the total tax revenues mirror the experience of all other states in the 
same period. This can be seen quite clearly in Figure 4 which presents the trend in the 
ratio of corporate income tax to total tax collections in Georgia for the same ratio all 
states. Table 6 illustrates the trend in this ratio for other Southeastern states.  For each 
state has seen the corporate income tax become less important as a percentage of total 
tax receipts. 
Georgia’s Corporate Income  
and Net Worth Taxes 
 
 
FIGURE 4.  COMPARISON OF THE RATIO OF CIT TO TOTAL TAX REVENUES  
FOR GEORGIA AND THE U.S., 1979-2001 
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TABLE 6.  PERCENTAGE OF STATE TAX REVENUES FROM  
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, SOUTHEAST, 1979, 1989, AND 2000 
 1979 1989 2000 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Florida 
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
5.8%
8.4%
7.3%
9.2%
7.9%
9.7%
4.9%
8.7%
9.2%
10.1%
7.7%
5.9%
5.1%
5.8%
8.3%
7.6%
8.7%
6.3%
10.7%
5.9%
9.1%
5.2%
3.8% 
4.9% 
4.8% 
5.3% 
4.0% 
3.4% 
4.8% 
6.5% 
3.6% 
7.9% 
4.5% 
SOURCE:  Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government finances 
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What explains the declining relative importance of Georgia's corporate 
income tax?  To answer this we need to examine causes for the relative decline in 
revenues outside the control of the state, or, differently put, causes for the decline in 
revenues that are shared with other states.  Georgia's experience with a continuing 
decrease in importance of the corporate franchise tax does not differ much from that 
of other states with a corporate income tax, or indeed from the experience of the 
corporate income tax at the federal level.43 
At the federal level, collections from the corporate income tax have been declining 
since the 1960s when the corporate income tax represented as much as one-fifth of 
federal total tax revenues.  Since the mid 1980s, corporate income tax collections 
have represented approximately one-tenth of federal total tax revenues.  Part of this 
decline is associated with policy changes granting more favorable tax treatment to 
corporations. This started with the investment tax credits of the 1960s and culminated 
with the Accelerated Cost Recovery Act of 1981. The Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 
1986 was, in part, an attempt to turn around the declining revenues from the corporate 
income tax by taking away many of the tax advantages granted in the past, by 
reducing capital depreciation allowances, and by introducing an alternative minimum 
tax.  
However, there were other offsetting changes in the tax environment 
since1986. Perhaps the most important was the number of corporations that elected to 
organize as S Corporations after the 1986 TRA. The relative growth in the number of 
S Corporations is commonly identified as a significant source of erosion in corporate 
tax revenues.44 
Under the Internal Revenue Code, small, closely held companies can elect to 
be treated differently than traditional, or “Chapter C Corporations.” By electing to be 
taxed as an S Corporation a firm obtains “pass through” (from the corporation to the 
shareholders) treatment of any profits earned in a tax year.  Thus, if a company is 
                                                 
43 See also Sally Wallace, Trends In Corporate Income Tax Receipts, FRP Report No. 52 
(December 2000) for more details about Georgia’s corporate income tax receipts over time. 
44See e.g. Susan Wittman, “S Corporation Returns,” Statistics of Income Bulletin, (Spring 2001): 
48-101. 
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eligible for an S Corporation election, it need not pay any Federal corporate income 
tax.  Essentially, the company grants a dividend to its shareholders and they, in turn, 
would pay individual income tax on the dividend. This avoids the normal double 
taxation of profits that occurs though corporate taxation. Many states, including 
Georgia, treat S Corporations in the same manner.45   
 S Corporations are becoming more important as a form of doing business.  
Figure 5 shows the total and S Corporation returns for 1980-1998 (the latest year 
available). In 1980, the S Corporations constituted 21 percent of corporate returns.  
By 1998, S Corporations -constituted about 53 percent of all federal income tax 
returns.   
FIGURE 5.  TOTAL AND S CORPORATION FILINGS, 1980-1998 
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Source:  IRS Statistics of Income, 1998.
45However, S corporations do face a number of restrictions that do not affect C corporations. S 
corporations can not have more than 75 shareholders, they can issue only one type of stock, they 
must be a domestic corporation (US), and they may not be part of an affiliated group. 
Georgia’s Corporate Income  
and Net Worth Taxes 
 
 
 Over this period the percentage of net income earned by S corporations also 
rose.  In 1986, the net income earned by S Corporations was 5.9 percent of total 
corporate earnings, and by 1998 it amounted to 14.9 percent.  Similarly, assets held 
by S Corporations in 1980 accounted for only 1.9 percent of corporation assets, but 
by 1998 they had almost 38 percent of corporate assets.46 
Table 7 shows that Georgia has experienced a similar trend in its S 
Corporation filings.  Over the periods 1993 to 1997 we saw the percentage of S 
corporation filings increase from 50.42 percent to 57.28 percent.  Furthermore, 
Georgia S Corporations represent a substantial percentage of net worth of the 
companies taxable in Georgia.47 What makes the Georgia experience different from 
the federal experiences is that the percentage of net worth coming from S 
Corporations is relatively high in Georgia and at the same time also appears to be 
more volatile. 
TABLE 7.  GEORGIA “S CORP” AND “C CORP” FILINGS, 1993-1997 
 
 
 
 
Tax Year 
 
 
 
C Corp 
Filings 
 
 
 
S Corp 
Filings 
 
 
S Corps as 
Percent of 
Total Filings 
S Corp  
Net Worth  
as Percent of 
Total Net 
Worth 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
56,503 
60,180 
63,073 
65,097 
63,505 
57,460 
63,715 
70,631 
78,401 
85,157 
50.42% 
51.43% 
52.83% 
54.64% 
57.28% 
43.95% 
81.18% 
10.27% 
59.41% 
66.02% 
SOURCE:  Georgia Corporate Income Tax Database 
 
 Not all the decrease in revenues from corporate income taxes can be traced to 
changes in tax policies and the rise of S Corporations. It appears that there has also 
been a persistent downward trend in the relative importance in the base of the 
                                                 
46See Robert Carrol and David Joulfain, “Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financial Decisions? The 
choice of Organizational Form,” mimeo, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
1993.   
47Using the net worth component of the income tax (discussed below) it is possible to determine 
the amount of taxable net worth allocated to Georgia.  S Corporation net worth as a percentage of 
total net worth is calculated as the Georgia Net worth of the S Corporation divided by the sum of 
the S corporation net worth and the C corporation net worth. 
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corporate income tax predating the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Auerbach and Poterba,48 
who have studied the long-term decline in federal corporate income tax revenues, 
find that while the average tax rate of corporate taxation had fallen by one-third from 
the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, corporate profitability had declined by a factor of 
two in the same period.  While it has been relatively easy to untangle the causes 
behind lower average corporate tax rates, to date there is no clear understanding of 
why corporate profitability has decreased so much. The profit rate had a downward 
trend since the 1960s and dropped most sharply in the 1980s.49 Many observers 
associate this sharp decrease with the oil crisis that occurred about the same time. In 
more recent years, the rate of profitability has turned around but it has not reached the 
levels of the 1960s or early 1970s, except for the temporary boom from the e-
commerce bubble. 
In addition to decreases in corporate profitability, there is more sophisticated 
tax planning at both the state and federal level. First, one of the more important tax 
issues facing the Treasury and Congress is the alleged growth of corporate tax 
shelters.  The use of tax shelters, while seemingly innocuous, may have implications 
for the collection of the corporate income tax at the federal level and at the state level 
if the state takes its definition of income from the federal tax form.  One of the major 
problems with corporate shelters is that the scope of the problem is not well known.  
It is difficult for the IRS to determine how much income is being lost as a result of 
the sheltering activity. Since Georgia starts from the Federal Income Tax definition of 
net taxable income, Georgia should also be concerned about how corporations shelter 
their income.  
The Department of the Treasury issued a report in 1999 detailing the types of 
tax shelters it has seen and recommendations for the proper legislative treatment.50  
Yale Law School Professor Michael Graetz defined a tax shelter as “a deal done by 
                                                 
48See Alan J. Auerbach and James Poterba, “Why Have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined?”  in 
L. Summers ed., Tax Policy and the Economy (MIT Press: Cambridge) 1987. 
49From an average of 10.9 percent in the 1960s the profit rate fell to 7.2 percent during the 1970s 
and 4.9 percent during the first half of the 1980s. 
50U.S. Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Discussion, 
Analysis, and Legislative Proposals, 1999. http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/papers/ 
corp_shelter.pdf . 
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very smart people, that absent tax considerations, would be very stupid.”51  Tax 
shelters that have no value except their tax benefits also have problems that increase 
the cost of the shelters to society.  First, obviously, is the loss of tax revenue that 
comes with sheltering taxable income (e.g. legal and accounting fees).  Second, is the 
problem that shelters often come with a high transactions cost.52  Thus, the Treasury 
loses income and society wastes resources sheltering the income.  Third, there is 
generally no offsetting economic benefit.  In fact, as Professor Graetz’s statement 
makes clear, there is no economic substance to the transaction.   
Finally, society must pay the additional costs of litigation of shelters of near 
legality (or near illegality) as well as the costs of rewriting tax rules over and over to 
reduce the likelihood of future abusive shelters.  This could be an increasingly futile 
effort. 
As corporations become multinational in scope and operation, there is the 
opportunity for businesses to reincorporate outside the United States in a tax haven 
that treats corporations in a more favorable manner. However, this activity is coming 
under increasing scrutiny with bills in the U.S. House and Senate introduced in early 
2002 to attempt to regulate this behavior.53 
At the state level there is also a type of tax planning that has states, including 
Georgia, concerned.  This planning involves an offshore jurisdiction or a foreign state 
such as Nevada or Delaware that has laws to accommodate this particular type of 
plan.  To avoid paying state income tax to Georgia, it is possible to set up a Delaware 
holding company (or a Nevada holding company) whereby the holding company 
becomes the owner of intellectual property (e.g., trademarks, copyrights, and patents) 
of the firm.54  The holding company then leases back to the operating company the 
right to use the intellectual property.  Since this licensing fee is a deductible expense, 
                                                 
51See, Tom Herman, “Tax Report”, Wall Street Journal, A-1 (February 10, 1999) 
52In one case (ASA Investing v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998)), the transactions cost 
were 26.5 percent of the purported tax saving of $93.5 million. 
53HR 3384 Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2002 and S. 2119 Reversing the Expatriation of 
Profits Offshore Act both in the 107th Congress, Second Session. 
54Delaware exempts from its corporate income tax those companies holding solely intangible 
assets.  Nevada, in turn, does not have a corporate income tax.  Thus both states would allow 
companies to employ tax planning to avoid state income taxes. 
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profits are reduced.  In fact, the licensing fees may be structured to eliminate a 
company’s tax liability completely. 
The states have been aggressive in attempting to litigate to void these 
arrangements, as the stakes are potentially quite large. In 1990, Toys’RUs earned $55 
million in royalty and license fees by charging the individual stores for the rights to 
employ the trademarks, the name, and for merchandizing skills.55 In another  
example,  Kmart earned some $125 million in royalty income from 1991-1995 using 
a similar tactic.56  Georgia also has had an experience with this issue.  In 1994, the 
Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a plan by Aaron Rents that employed a Delaware 
holding company structure to avoid significant amounts of state income taxes.57 
Given that most states’ corporate income tax laws are tied to the federal tax 
law, it is still important to look at how Georgia compares to other states.  The next 
section will examine the Southeastern states’ corporate income tax structures and 
compare them to Georgia’s. 
6. Georgia Versus Other Southeastern States 
Average Reliance on the Tax: Table 6 showed the ratio of corporate tax 
collections to total taxes collected.  In 2000, Georgia ranked 9th in the Southeast at 
5.30 percent.  Only North Carolina and Tennessee were more dependent on the tax 
than Georgia.58  Further, Table 8 shows the ratio of the corporate income tax 
collections  to  state  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  across the southeast. This is a 
 
                                                 
55Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, State of South Carolina Supreme Court, 
Opinion No.   23886, July 6, 1993.  
56In the Matter of Kmart Properties, Inc., New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, No. 
00-04, Jan 31, 2000. The case further revealed that Kmart's holding company earned an additional 
$78 million over the same five-year period by lending its royalty receipts back to Kmart usually 
within two or three days from when they were received.  See Michael Mazerov, “Closing Three 
Common Loopholes Could Raise Additional Revenue for Many States,” Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (April 2002) http://www.cbpp.org/4-9-02sfp.htm,  Tax Analyst Reference 2002 
STT 82-1. 
57Aaron Rents Inc. v. Marcus E. Collins, Sr., No D-96025 (Fulton County Superior Court, June 27, 
1994).  The Georgia Supreme Court decline to hear this case on appeal on August 24, 1994.   
58 As with each of the following statistics, one should not focus on one over another, but look at 
them as a whole.  The economies of each of the states, while similar in many respects are not 
identical:  some are more based on manufacturing, others are service oriented, and still others are 
agricultural. 
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TABLE 8.  COMPARISON OF THE RATIO OF CORPORATE INCOME 
TAX COLLECTIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OF STATE GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT IN THE SOUTHEASTERN US, 1999 
 
State 
Ratio of  
CIT to GSP 
 
Rank in SE 
Virginia 
Alabama 
Louisiana 
South Carolina 
Kentucky 
Florida 
Georgia 
Arkansas 
Tennessee 
North Carolina 
Mississippi 
0.171% 
0.203% 
0.222% 
0.241% 
0.275% 
0.286% 
0.288% 
0.328% 
0.336% 
0.356% 
0.357% 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
US Average 0.330%  
SOURCE:  Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
gross indication of how intensively the state taxes its state product.  Georgia is ranked 
7th out of the 11 states.   
Tax rate and tax base:  Georgia has a corporate income tax structure that is 
typical in the South. With respect to tax rates, Georgia's rate of 6 percent is on the 
upper end of the range of the southeastern states (see Table 9). Tennessee and 
Virginia have the same rate of 6 percent. Florida, Alabama and South Carolina have 
lower rates, while North Carolina and West Virginia have higher rates. Several other 
states use a progressive schedule, generally with a top rate over 6 percent.  Figure 6 
shows the marginal tax rates for a number of southeastern states and shows that after 
$1,000,000 of taxable income, Georgia is below only Louisiana, Kentucky, and North 
Carolina. Thus, Georgia’s marginal tax rate of 6 percent is among the highest in the 
southeast for large profitable firms. 
With respect to the tax base, Georgia couples the state tax to the federal tax 
with taxable income after special deductions in the federal tax, as do most other states 
in the Southeast. However, North Carolina, Tennessee and Louisiana start with 
taxable income before these special deductions.  Georgia allows for 3-year carry back  
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TABLE 9.  COMPARISON OF CORPORATE TAX RATE ACROSS  
SOUTHEASTERN US, 2000 
 
State 
Tax Rates 
in Percent 
 
Tax Brackets 
Number of 
Brackets 
Alabama 5 ---Flat Rate--- 1 
Arkansas 1.0-6.5 3,000 100,000 6 
Florida 5.5 ---Flat Rate--- 1 
Georgia 6 ---Flat Rate--- 1 
Kentucky 4.0-8.25 25,000 250,000 5 
Louisiana 4.0-8.0 25,000 200,000 5 
Mississippi 3.0-5.0 5,000 10,000 3 
North Carolina 7.25 ---Flat Rate--- 1 
South Carolina 5 ---Flat Rate--- 1 
Tennessee 6 ---Flat Rate--- 1 
Virginia 6 ---Flat Rate--- 1 
SOURCE:  Federation of Tax Administrators, http://www.taxadmin.org. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.  SOUTHEASTERN MARGINAL TAX RATES, 2001 
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of net operating losses (NOLs) and a 15-year period for losses carried forward. Half 
of the states in the South do not allow the carry back of losses. Georgia, like most 
southern states, exempts interest earned on U.S. securities;59 only Florida and 
Tennessee tax it.60  
Conclusions:  The corporate income tax is not a stable source of income as it 
is subject to business cycle fluctuations. Georgia seems to rely more on the corporate 
income tax as a percentage of total tax receipts than most of the other states in the 
Southeast.  As a percentage of state GDP, Georgia is also one of the highest in the 
southeast in terms of its demand on state product.  In addition, its tax rate is among 
the highest in the Southeast.  Finally, because Georgia’s tax collections from the 
corporate income tax is influenced by the Federal tax law, its own use of credits, the 
growth of S Chapter Corporations, and the growth of state tax planning, the amount 
collected in the future will most likely continue to decline as a percentage of total tax 
receipts.   
B. Net Worth Tax 
The net worth tax in Georgia is a tax placed on the net worth of the 
corporation, which includes issued capital stock, paid-in-surplus, and earned 
surplus.61  Essentially this tax is on the value of the equity of the firm.  Capital stock 
is the value of the corporation’s preferred or common stock, while paid-in-surplus is 
defined as the price paid by investors per share over the par value per share, times the 
number of shares issued. Finally, earned surplus is merely the retained earnings of the 
firm.  Together these account for the net worth (or equity value) of the firm.  The tax 
is graduated starting at $10 for companies with net worth less than $10,000 and rising 
to $5,000 for companies with over $22,000,000 in net worth. 
For foreign corporations (non-Georgia) there is a procedure to allocate a 
portion of the company’s net worth to Georgia.  The allocation is based on the sum of 
                                                 
59The U.S. Supreme court requires states to tax U.S. Securities in a manner consistent with a state's 
taxation of its own securities. See, OCGA § 48-7-27b(1)A - b(1)13. 
60 See e.g. Multistate Corporate Tax Guide 2001 (Vol I): 419-422. 
61OCGA § 48-13-73. 
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the value of property located in Georgia and gross receipts in Georgia relative to 
everywhere else.62 
Historically, tax collections from the net worth tax follow the general 
economic cycle, increasing in years of general economic growth and decreasing 
during a recession (recall Figure 3).  In real terms (using 1984 as the base year) the 
net worth tax has barely increased, going from just over $10 million in 1978 to 
approximately $11 million in 2001.   While somewhat cyclical in nature, its 
importance to Georgia has diminished as the ratio of the net worth tax to total taxes 
has fallen from 0.33 percent in 1978 to approximately 0.15 percent in 2001 (Figure 
7). 
FIGURE 7.  RATIO OF NET WORTH TAX TO TOTAL TAX REVENUES 
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62OCGA § 48-13-75. 
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The current revenue from the net worth tax to the state is minimal. However, 
the tax does act as a minimum tax on companies doing business in Georgia.  Further, 
it is applied to all corporations, so insurance companies and S corporations pay this 
tax as well. As currently structured, the net worth tax is not an effective alternative 
minimum tax since its highest level is only $5,000, but it could be altered to suit that 
need if desired. 
C. General Issues and Options for Reform 
There are a number of specific topics relative to Georgia’s corporation taxes 
worthy of further discussion.  These include changes in nexus (the right of the state to 
tax income), changes in the apportionment formula, the use of separate versus 
combined reporting; the development of an alternative minimum tax (AMT), and the 
potential for scrapping the current tax scheme for a value added tax.  The next 
sections discus each of these potential changes. 
1. Nexus 
Nexus is defined as the minimum (legal or constitutional) connection 
necessary to give the state the right to tax a business.  For example, if there was a 
firm doing business outside the state of Georgia with no connection whatsoever to the 
state, Georgia would not be constitutionally permitted to tax that business.  Further, 
the Supreme Court has held that an out-of-state mail order business could not be 
taxed if all it did was mail goods to the state.  If there were no employees within the 
state, no sales agents, no property, no advertising or connection other than the mail 
order sale, the Court held that general due process (or fairness) would prohibit the 
state from imposing a sales tax on out-of-state-activities.63  Even though this example 
is based on the sale and use tax it is illustrative of the basic problem of interstate 
taxation.  In order to legally tax activities within a state, there must be some type of 
connection, or nexus, to the taxing state.  Generally, nexus is established through 
                                                 
63Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (1992).  In this case the Supreme court 
overturned  a North Dakota Supreme Court opinion which allowed the taxation of an Illinois 
office supply mail order companies sales in North Dakota.  The Illinois company had no agents, 
property, employees, or other contact with North Dakota. Thus, without a physical presence in the 
state, North Dakota would not be able to tax these sales. 
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property owned, sales solicited though agents, employees operating in state, or 
advertising in state. 
Each state has a slightly different definition of what constitutes nexus; some 
are conservative and some are broad.  Georgia’s definition of nexus includes all 
activities for financial profit or gain.64 Georgia’s definition and its administrative 
implementation do not appear overly broad by national standards.65 For example, 
Georgia does not consider the licensing of software or intangible rights or simply 
listing a company name in a phone book as activities creating income tax nexus, as 
other states do. On the other hand, Georgia is more likely to consider that nexus 
results from in-state sales activities than many other states.   
What is apparently missing in Georgia, and in a number of other states, is a 
new standard for e-commerce activities.  Just as a simple example, suppose a 
company in Florida contracts with a company in Georgia to host a website on 
computers physically located in Georgia.  If the Florida company has no other 
connection to Georgia, would this contact be sufficient for nexus?  This is an example 
of the types of questions that will need to be answered as technology alters how firms 
conduct business.  Even if Georgia examines these e-commerce activities more 
closely and attempts to define nexus to cover them, Congress may pre-empt the states 
from  taxing  in this area.  Congress is currently considering a bill entitled the Internet  
Tax Fairness Act of 2001.66  This bill, if enacted, would prohibit nexus without a 
physical presence.  Specifically excluded from state taxing authority would be nexus 
based on the following: 
• solicitation of orders; 
• presence of intangible property or intellectual property within the state; 
• presence of a world wide web internet site on a server located within the 
state; 
                                                 
64OCGA § 48-731(a). 
65See e.g. Multistate Tax Guide 2001 (Vol. I): 41-122. 
66Internet Tax Fairness Act of 2001, HR 2526 (107 Congress, 1st Session) 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_bills&docid=f:h2526ih.txt.
pdf. The Act has had sub committee hearings in the House Judiciary Committee on September 11, 
2001, but has not progressed beyond this stage.  
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• use of an internet service provider located within the state; 
• leasing or owning of certain property (for less than 30 days) for the 
purposes of assembly or testing of machinery and equipment for eventual 
sale or lease to a resident of the state; 
• assignment of personnel to the state for a 30 day period or less if the 
personnel were directly related to the purchasing of goods or services, 
gathering news and covering events, meeting with government officials, 
attending conferences, seminars and similar functions; 
• use of an independent contractor in a state for the purpose of performing 
warranty or repair services with respect to tangible or intangible personal 
property sold by a person located outside the state. 
Georgia may benefit from not moving aggressively on e-commerce nexus 
issues as it may dampen e-commerce activity in the state.  In any case, if Congress 
does move to provide nexus relief for e-commerce activities, Georgia’s law would be 
pre-empted.   
2. Apportionment Formula 
As discussed above, when corporations are involved in businesses in several 
states, each state employs a formula to apportion the corporation's share of income on 
which to levy the state corporation tax. Georgia now uses the double weighted sales, 
three-factor formula. Thus, sales are weighted 50 percent, payroll is weighted 25 
percent, and revenues are weighted 25 percent. 
Over the past decade more states have made use of modified apportionment 
formulas. The most common modification is the switch to a double-weighted sales 
factor in the traditional equally weighted three-factor formula.  Several states have 
also adopted a single factor sales formula that places a 100 percent weighting on 
sales. The overriding consideration for the adoption of modified formulas, giving 
more weight to the sales factor, is to encourage the location of manufacturing 
businesses in the state. On the surface, it appears the heavier weight given to sales in 
the modified formulas decreases the tax burden of companies with property and 
payroll in the state while it increases the tax burden for out-of-state companies mostly 
selling commodities within the state.  However, Edmiston has described this effect in 
a slightly different manner.  The benefit from the reweighing of the apportionment 
formula comes not from a lower tax liability, but a decrease in the implicit excise tax 
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on payroll and property within the states.  Thus, in effect, it becomes cheaper to own 
property and employ workers in the state, all other things equal.67 
Table 10 shows the use of the apportionment formula by southern states.  
Most states in the southeast employ the double weighted sales formula.  Alabama 
appears to be the only state to still employ the equal weighted three-factor formula. 
Georgia adopted its formula in 1995 in response to a perception that it needed to do 
so to remain competitive with other states.   
TABLE 10.  SOUTHEASTERN STATES’ USE OF  
APPORTIONMENT FORMULAS 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Florida 
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
3 Factor 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
Double Weighted Sales 
SOURCE:  Federation of Tax Administrators, 
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/corp_app.html 
 
There has been a suggestion that Georgia change its apportionment formula 
once again.  The change would be to use a single factor sales formula, which is used 
by only a handful of states.  The idea behind the single factor approach is to stimulate 
economic development in Georgia and to shift taxes to out-of-state corporations.  
This would especially benefit those companies with significant presence in the state, 
and also have significant sales activity outside the state.  Research in the 1980s and 
1990s found that changing from an equal weighted approach to a double-weighted 
sales approach was consistent with increases in economic activity.68  However, 
                                                 
67 Kelly Edmiston, The Manipulation of State Corporate Income Tax Apportionment Formulas as 
an Economic Development Tool, FRP Report No. 26 (November 1998) forthcoming National Tax 
Journal. 
68Austan Goolsbee and Edward L. Maydew, Coveting Thy Neighbor's Manufacturing: The 
Dilemma of State Income Apportionment, Journal of Public Economics, 75 (January 2000): 833-
839. 
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Edmiston has shown that the movement to a heavier weighted sales factor may have a 
differential  effect,  as there will be some winners and some losers in a move to a new 
apportionment formula.69  Further, while examining the question of whether Georgia 
would benefit from a single factor sales apportionment formula, he finds that while a 
single factor approach would likely stimulate economic development in the state to 
some degree, there will be a reduction in the growth rate of corporate income tax 
revenues that would last many years.70  
3.  Income Reporting:  Separate Accounting vs. Unitary Approach  
Georgia uses separate income accounting -- the detailed allocation of receipts 
and expenditures to each separate legal entity -- when considering the income of 
integrated corporations. Thus, if there are two related corporations doing business 
within and outside the state, the Georgia statute allows each of the legal entities to 
report their separate accounts and profits.71 Georgia is not out of line with other states 
on this issue, but there may be compelling reasons to change to a unitary system of 
reporting. 
The main difficulty with separate accounting reporting is that it allows 
corporations to employ strategies to reduce the state tax liability in an artificial and, 
potentially, inequitable way. Under separate income accounting, corporations have a 
strong incentive (and are allowed) to shift profits to those states that will tax profits 
more lightly or that do not tax them at all. The shifting of profits across state lines is 
easily accomplished by using internal transfer pricing arrangements or by establishing 
shell passive-income companies in states, such as Delaware, that exempt this type of 
income. As discussed above, the Delaware holding company is given the property 
right to the use of the name of the parent company, and at the same time the parent 
company leases back the right to use the name in exchange for a share of the sales 
proceeds from its associated companies.  Aaron Rents, a case decided in Fulton 
                                                 
69Kelly Edmiston, The Manipulation of State Corporate Income Tax Apportionment Formulas as 
an Economic Development Tool,  FRP Report No. 26 (November 1998) forthcoming National Tax 
Journal (2002). 
70Kelly Edmiston, A Single Factor Sale Apportionment for the State of Georgia, FRP Report No. 
55 (January 2001).  
71OCGA § 48-7-34. 
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County in 1994, upheld a Georgia company’s ability to reduce its tax liability in 
Georgia by 90 percent after establishing a Delaware holding company.  72 A similar 
approach is being used by corporations that set up an investment holding company 
offshore (in, say, Bermuda) to avoid federal corporate income taxes.73 
The most used alternative to the separate accounting reporting method is to 
put all legally related companies into a unitary business and require that they file a 
combined income tax return. If we assume the combined income of all related 
corporations worldwide is in the unitary business, net income is allocated to each 
subsidiary using an apportionment formula. The impact of this approach is that it 
destroys any possibility of using strategies to reduce the state taxable income by any 
particular corporation.   
Strictly on economic and tax enforcement merit grounds, all economists 
would agree that combined reporting is the only way to report income for state tax 
purposes. Combined income reporting, however, has gained a bad reputation in 
business circles because of the aggressiveness with which California and other states 
used it on a worldwide basis. Most of the states using combined income reporting 
apply it only to the territory of the U.S., following the “water edge” rule.74   This 
results in a more “equitable” tax policy and at the same time reduces incentives to 
engage in artificial and distortionary tax planning.  Because corporations may still 
shelter off-shore income, there are still incentives to do so.  Further, as corporations’ 
international operations increase, the state tax benefits (in terms of revenue raising) 
from worldwide combined reporting increase. 
The adoption of combined income reporting may be considered anti-business 
and therefore politically unwise. However, two factors should be considered. First, 
                                                 
72Aaron Rents Inc. v. Marcus E. Collins, Sr., No D-96025 (Fulton County Superior Court, June 27, 
1994).  The Georgia Supreme Court decline to hear this case on appeal on August 24, 1994.  Thus, 
the holding of the trial court was upheld. 
73 Rep. Richard Neal, D-Mass recently introduced the “Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 
2002” to permit taxation of U.S. companies that reincorporate oversees to avoid U.S. tax law.  HR 
3884, 107th Congress (2d Session), 2002. 
74See e.g. George Carlson and Harvey Galper, “Water's Edge Versus Worldwide Unitary 
Combination” in Charles E. McLure, ed, The State Corporate Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide 
Unitary Combination (Stanford:  Hoover Institute Press) 1984, pp. 1-40. 
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there is evidence of tax base erosion within Georgia and this may be due to avoidance 
based on separate income accounting. Second, only those businesses presently taking 
advantage of separate income accounting rules would be hurt by a move to combined 
income reporting. 
The advantages of mandating combined income reporting for unitary 
businesses are many. Fundamentally, combined income reporting eliminates artificial 
discrepancies in the tax base through accounting and arbitrary allocations of revenues 
and expenses across state boundaries. Combined income reporting is not a panacea 
either. Mandating it will require a very clear set of regulations in complex areas. 
However, combined income reporting still is controversial as an 
apportionment method. Critics have argued that combined income reporting is 
contrary to the formulary apportionment of a single taxpayer's income. The reality is 
that single taxpayer formulary apportionment has become a fiction in a world where 
unitary businesses have at their disposal a variety of avenues to artificially reduce 
their state tax liabilities. 
Combined reporting should be distinguished from consolidated return filing. 
The following paragraphs describe some of these distinctions and briefly review the 
scope of issues that will have to be decided if mandatory combined income reporting 
were adopted. Combined reporting is an approach for determining the income 
attributable to a state from each of the corporations of an affiliated group of 
companies conducting a unitary business in several states.75  When there is more than 
one corporation in the affiliated group doing business in the state, the unitary income 
apportioned to the state is, in turn, apportioned among the different companies with 
nexus in the state.76  Depending on the type of combined reporting, not all affiliated 
corporations in a group may be combined. Combination applies to a “unitary 
business” and the determination of what this is can vary.  
 
                                                 
75See for example, James F. Buresh and Marc S. Weinstein, “Combined Reporting: The Approach 
and Its Problems,” Journal of State Taxation, vol. 1, no.1 Spring 1982, pp. 5-15. 
76Often the second stage apportionment is not done with the entire income apportioned to the state 
assessed to the “key corporation” of the group in the state. 
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It is important to distinguish between the filing of “combined income reports” 
and the filing of “consolidated returns.” These two terms are at times used 
interchangeably, but they are quite different. The objective of combined income 
reporting is not to tax the income of the affiliated group as a whole or file a 
consolidated return. Rather, the objective is to determine the portion of the income 
from the unitary business attributable to the companies with nexus, i.e. operating, in 
the state. The combined income report is an informational return rather then a tax 
return. Each corporation in a combined report with nexus in the state still has to file 
its own corporate tax return.  
By contrast, in a consolidated return the total net income of the corporations 
in the group is filed in a single return and a single tax is paid (even though each of the 
corporations is jointly and severally liable for payment). In the case of consolidated 
returns, net income is not limited to that related to a specific unitary business. Of 
course, when the consolidated business operates in more than one state, 
apportionment will be necessary in the consolidated return. 
Two important decisions need to be made if the State of Georgia were to 
require combined income reporting for all unitary business.  These concern the 
“basis”, or how far and wide the combination should go, and the “standards”, or how 
to determine which corporations should file a combined report.77 
There are three choices for the basis of combined income reporting, although 
some combinations of these three are also possible.  The first is worldwide 
combination, which includes all domestic and foreign income.  A second choice is to 
combine with a domestic or water's edge limitation, which would then only include 
U.S. source income.  Finally, Georgia could adopt a nexus combination including 
only those companies with nexus in the state, or corporations domiciled in the state or 
some combination. 
                                                 
77 Several administrative issues will also need to be addressed involving rules for the consolidation 
of intercompany transactions, the merging of different accounting periods, how to address 
partnerships in the affiliated group, how to deal with foreign source income, and whether there 
should be some modification of the apportionment formula to recognize the different nature of 
some of the corporations such as financial institutions and insurance companies. 
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The standards used to determine when a group of affiliated companies 
actually constitute a unitary business vary. The most common standard is based on 
the “three-unities” of common ownership, common management and common 
operation. Common ownership is typically interpreted to exist when another 
corporation owns 50 percent or more of the stock of another corporation. Common 
management is typically interpreted to exist when there are overlapping boards of 
directors or common managers in key positions. Common operation is interpreted to 
exist when there are common management functions, financing, accounting, 
advertising, or purchasing.  
Other standards rely on the existence of dependency or contributions between 
affiliated corporations, similarities in the line of business, or significant inter-
corporate transactions. 
4. Alternative Minimum Tax 
Another method of potentially reducing the loss of corporate income tax 
receipts is the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).  Many states at present have an 
AMT together with the regular corporate profit tax.  The AMT used by the states vary 
from direct application of the federal AMT to a flat amount, such as $250.  Georgia 
does not have an AMT, although the franchise tax levied on net worth may be 
interpreted as such.78   
There is a strong justification for an AMT.  First, it is possible that 
corporations do not pay an income tax because of net operating losses, use of tax 
shelters, or the use of separate accounting.  If the corporate tax is viewed as a tax on 
business to support services the state provides, then all companies should contribute 
even if a company has zero or negative income.  Thus, an AMT can be justified as a 
fee to the state for services provided the company.   
Another, less justifiable reason for the AMT is based on the assumption that 
corporations and not shareholders, employees, and consumers pay the corporate tax. 
Thus, corporations are separate entities and must contribute to the state revenue 
                                                 
78Note, the occupation tax and local franchise tax levied on banks and other depositary financial 
institutions and creditable against the corporate income tax may be considered as a minimum tax 
since banks have to pay the tax even when they do not have profits. 
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merely because of their existence.  To an economist, however, corporations do not 
pay taxes. It is the shareholders, employees, and consumers who pay the tax as the 
corporation is merely an artificial entity set up to do business with limited liability. 
The AMT also suffers from the fact that it is an add-on (or a band-aid) tax 
used when the corporate tax structure is being used in ways it might not have been 
intended to be used.  An AMT is easy to put in place.  However, an AMT does not 
necessarily solve the long-run problem declining tax receipts, since it does not 
address the fundamental underlying structural problems in the tax code. 
5 The Value-Added Tax 
No discussion of state taxes would be complete with out a general discussion 
of the Value-Added Tax (VAT).  In fact, while its use in the U.S. has been limited to 
Michigan and New Hampshire, it is in use in over 100 countries worldwide.  Further, 
while never enacted at the Federal level, it has been discussed for over 20 years as a 
replacement or supplemental tax.79 
The VAT is a tax applied to all commercial activities involving the 
production and distribution of goods or the provision of services. At one level it 
appears to be a sales tax, that is, it appears as a tax on a transaction.  However, what 
makes it theoretically different is that it is actually a tax on the value-added in the 
production and distribution of goods or services. For example, a company purchases 
raw materials for $100, fabricates them and sells the resulting product for $150.  The 
value added would be the difference between the cost of materials and the revenue 
received from this sale.  Thus, the tax would be placed on the $50 value added.  If the 
fabricated materials were then turned into manufactured goods and resold for $200, 
the value-added would be the additional $50.  Thus, the value-added tax would be 
placed upon the transaction at each stage of production.  In contrast, the retail sales 
tax would be placed on the final transaction. 
The major differences between the retail sales tax and the value added tax 
involve the administration of the two taxes.  A simple example gives the flavor for 
                                                 
79 See, e.g., Henry Aaron, “Introduction and Summary,” in The Value-Added Tax:  Lessons from 
Europe, H. Aaron ed. (Brookings Institution:  Washington, DC) 1981. 
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the potential administrative differences. Since the retail sales tax is on the final 
transaction, the audit process would focus on retail establishments and their 
collection and reporting of the tax.  In contrast, the value-added tax would require an 
audit process that could audit at all levels of transactions.  The administrative burden 
of the retail tax, while not minimal, is much less than would likely be imposed on all 
producers and service providers, as well as retailers. 
There are two ways of imposing the VAT.  Note first that the base of the 
VAT is sales less cost of materials.  This difference equal wages, interest and profits.  
The first method is called the invoice method.  Under this method, a firm is taxed on 
its total sales, but it is able to claim a credit for any VAT included on any invoice the 
firm pays.  Thus, this method has a built-in enforcement incentive.  The second 
method is similar to how the corporate income tax is currently handled, except that 
the firm includes wages, interest, and profits on the return, not just profits. 
The major benefits espoused by promoters of the VAT are increased 
revenues, increased savings formation, and increased investment.  For example, if a 
VAT were in place, it could conceivably cover the production of both goods and 
services.  While we tax corporate income for goods and service providers, the sales 
and use tax generally does not cover the sales of services.  Thus, broadening the tax 
by using a VAT base beyond the sale of goods could conceivably bring in significant 
revenue to the state. 
Another benefit of the VAT is that it is a consumption tax.  That is, the base 
of the tax is ultimately consumption, not profits.  Thus, savings in the form of a 
company’s retained earnings or personal savings are not taxable.  Since savings are 
tax-free, there is a corresponding incentive to save or invest.  A firm also has an 
incentive to invest in physical capital, as accounting depreciation has no influence on 
investment decisions in the absence of an income tax.  Finally, in the absence of an 
income tax, there is no double taxation of corporate income and the subsequent 
taxation of the corresponding dividends with the personal income tax. 
One of the major problems with the VAT is that it can mask the cost of 
government.  If the tax is built into the price of a good or service one may forget that 
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one is paying taxes.  Further, the VAT may be regressive. In fact, the issue may be 
worse as the VAT is applied to every sale.  In Georgia, we currently exempt most 
food for home consumption from the sales and use tax based on the assumption that 
lower income consumers consume more food as a percentage of income than higher 
income consumers.  An all-inclusive VAT would cover food.  Another problem, 
alluded to above, is that the administrative burden is likely higher than the retail sales 
tax burden for both the state and the taxpayers. 
As mentioned above, Michigan and New Hampshire currently have a value-
added tax.  Michigan’s Single Business Tax was put in place in 1976, but starting in 
1999 the tax is being phased out over a 23-year period because of its complexity and 
perceived unfairness.80  New Hampshire’s tax is simpler and has a much lower rate 
than the Michigan tax (2.3 percent versus 0.75 percent).   Essentially, New 
Hampshire’s tax is a tax on wages, compensation, and dividends and is taxed at a rate 
of 0.75 percent.  The only exemptions are for companies with gross receipts less than 
$150,000 or the sum of wages, compensation, and dividends is less than $75,000.81  
The Michigan tax differs from the New Hampshire tax due to numerous exemptions, 
deductions, and credits.  However, capital investment is specifically deductible in 
Michigan. 
Kenyon undertook an analysis of the New Hampshire VAT.82  Her analysis is 
limited to New Hampshire, but may provide some insight to the issues in Georgia. 
New Hampshire does not have a retail sales tax and its income tax is narrowly limited 
to taxing dividends and interest income.  Thus, the New Hampshire VAT tax did not 
replace any current tax.  A broader income tax is prohibited for political reasons, yet 
the state needed to complement its tax revenues in some meaningful manner.  In fact, 
                                                 
80There are a number of exemptions, deductions, and credits to the tax that increased its 
complexity.  Further, since the tax is payable when corporate income is zero or negative many 
thought the tax to be unfair.  For a discussion of the two state implementations of the VAT, see 
Daphne Kenyon, “A New State VAT?  Lessons from New Hampshire,” National Tax Journal 49 
(September 1996): 381-399. 
81NH Revised Statutes Annotated 77-E. 
82 See Kenyon supra note 80. 
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the VAT was successful, accounting for approximately 20 percent of state revenue in 
2001.83 
The use of a VAT in Georgia would likely be part of a significant tax reform 
as its imposition could likely affect the sales and use tax.  Unlike New Hampshire, 
Georgia has significant revenue from the sale and use tax as well as the corporate 
income tax.  Thus, the revenue demand from the VAT as a replacement for these 
taxes would likely be significant.  However, Georgia could employ the VAT as a new 
complementary tax rather than a replacement of the corporate income and sales and 
use tax.  In this case, the benefits to Georgia might be akin to the imposition of an 
alternative minimum tax.  The VAT may be able to reduce the erosion of the 
corporate income tax, especially if it was applied to all business irrespective of 
corporate form. Further, the VAT is better in the sense that it may likely raise more 
revenue than the AMT, and is, on the surface, less arbitrary than the AMT. 
 
                                                 
83 New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration, Annual Report, 2001, 
http://webster.state.nh.us/revenue/publications/index.htm. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
The Georgia corporate income tax is the third largest contributor to state 
revenues behind the personal income tax and the state sales tax.  However, it is an 
unstable source of state revenue for two reasons.  First, the tax base, i.e. profits,  
fluctuates widely over the business cycle.  Second, it is “leaky” in the sense that the 
tax is becoming a smaller portion of the state’s tax revenues.  This loss of revenue is 
likely due to a combination of factors such as the increased use of tax credits; the use 
of sophisticated tax planning at the federal and state level which can allow for 
strategic tax reporting in separate tax returns or the use of special holding company 
structures; the use of different organizational forms to avoid the corporate income 
tax; and changes in the apportionment formula.  Further, the net worth tax, while 
never a large contributor to the state’s tax receipts, has become even less important 
over time. 
This report also considered five potential changes to the Georgia corporate 
income tax.  The first is the need to reexamine the nexus requirements in light of 
changing technology.  Policy makers may need to address issues of whether 
expansion or reduction of nexus is desirable.  Second, the issue of the apportionment 
formula is likely to be revisited.  Evidence shows that there will be winners and 
losers from a change to a single factor apportionment formula, but any benefits are 
likely to be found only in the long-term.  Third, separate accounting has problems.  
Taxpayers can employ sophisticated tax strategies to shift income overseas or to other 
states.  This will only get worse without changes to how corporations report their 
company-wide income.  However, it should be noted that states might compete on 
how they allow firms to report just as they do with other parts of the tax code so as to 
attract business to the state.  Fourth, an AMT could be employed to reduce the 
“deterioration” of corporate revenues to the state.  The AMT does not really solve 
any problems, but it may prolong the time before they have to be dealt with properly. 
 Finally, we discuss the value-added tax.  The imposition of a VAT in Georgia 
needs a careful consideration.  If a full reform of Georgia’s tax system is undertaken, 
an examination of the VAT is warranted.  The VAT has a number of benefits.  
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However, it does come with some increased administrative costs.  Alternatively, if 
there is no major reform of the overall Georgia tax system, the VAT may be 
employed as a complementary tax rather than a replacement tax. This may be useful 
to offset the erosion we observe in the corporate income tax. 
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